$3.8 billion a year: Unpacked answers your questions about US aid to Israel

From Israel’s founding in 1948 through 2025, the U.S. provided approximately $174 billion in aid to the Jewish state.
American and Israeli flags are seen during the demonstration supporting American-Israeli strikes in Iran, at Main Square in Krakow, Poland on March 8, 2026. (Photo by Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

On November 3, the morning of the midterm elections in the United States, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would stop giving Israel roughly $4 billion a year in military aid by the end of 2026. But the current aid agreement runs through September 2028, and how his announcement would translate into policy remains unclear. 

Why does the U.S. give Israel billions of dollars in the first place? Is the aid actually ending, and why now? And what would ending it mean for the U.S.-Israel relationship?

We’re here to answer your questions about what this means, how U.S. aid to Israel works, where that money goes, and why it has become so contested in recent years.

How much aid does Israel get, and where does the money go?

In a typical year, Israel receives about $3.8 billion in U.S. military aid, under a 2016 agreement reached during President Barack Obama’s administration. Known as a memorandum of understanding, or MOU, the agreement covers fiscal years 2019 through 2028. 

The deal pledges $3.3 billion a year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), grants that Israel uses to buy weapons, equipment, and related services, plus $500 million a year for joint missile defense programs such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and the Iron Beam laser system. Congress also funds smaller cooperative programs outside that deal, such as counter-tunnel and counter-drone research, which totaled $202 million in 2026.

That annual figure can rise sharply in wartime. In April 2024, during the war in Gaza, Congress approved an emergency aid package that provided Israel with $8.7 billion: $3.5 billion in FMF and $5.2 billion for air defense systems. Since the October 7, 2023, attacks, Israel has received at least $16.3 billion in direct military aid.

From Israel’s founding in 1948 through 2025, the U.S. provided approximately $174 billion in aid, roughly $298 billion when adjusted for inflation in 2024 dollars. That makes Israel the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign aid since World War II.

Not all U.S. support shows up as a dollar figure. The U.S. keeps a stockpile of weapons and munitions in Israel, known as War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Israel. It is mainly meant for U.S. forces in the region, but Israel has drawn on it during wars. Israel has also received $6.6 billion worth of surplus U.S. military equipment since 1992.

Aid also isn’t the same as arms sales, though the two are often lumped together. When Israel buys American weapons with its own money, that’s a sale. Ending aid would not mean ending those sales.

Most of the money Israel gets goes right back to the U.S. Rather than an open check Israel can spend however it likes, the aid pays for weapons systems and services from American defense contractors, including F-35 and F-15 fighter jets, refueling planes, helicopters, ammunition, fuel, and bulldozers.

That gives the companies that build those weapons a major stake in the debate. Most aid funds flow back to firms like Boeing, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin, which run large lobbying operations in Washington. 

Even the missile defense money comes with a “buy American” requirement. Under the current agreement, at least half of the joint procurement funds Israel receives must be spent in the U.S. Tamir interceptors for Iron Dome, for example, are now being made at a new factory in Camden, Arkansas, run by a joint venture between Raytheon and Israel’s Rafael. The factory delivered its first batch in October.

Israel used to be partially exempt from the requirement to spend FMF on American equipment. Under a previous agreement, it could spend up to 26.3% of its aid on Israeli-made equipment, a perk known as Off-Shore Procurement that no other aid recipient received. The 2016 agreement phases that exception out completely by 2028. 

For Israel, the aid is about more than money. Researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), a Tel Aviv think tank, describe the aid as “not merely a funding source but part of a deep security-technological relationship that shapes the IDF’s force buildup.”

Why did the US start giving Israel aid?

President Harry Truman recognized Israel just 11 minutes after it declared independence in 1948. But for more than a decade afterward, Washington kept its distance militarily and refused to sell Israel major weapons. France became Israel’s main arms supplier.

That began to change in August 1962, when President John F. Kennedy approved the sale of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel. It was the first major weapon system the U.S. provided to Israel, though it was a sale, not a gift. 

A bigger shift came after the 1967 Six-Day War, when France imposed an arms embargo on Israel and, a year later, the U.S. agreed to sell Israel 50 Phantom fighter jets.

This was at the height of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was arming Egypt and Syria, and Washington increasingly saw Israel as a counterweight to the USSR’s influence in the Middle East.

The real turning point was the 1973 Yom Kippur War. After Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on the holiest day of the Jewish year, the U.S. airlifted weapons to Israel. Congress then passed a $2.2 billion emergency package, and President Richard Nixon converted $1.5 billion of it into outright grants, the largest U.S. grant to Israel up to that point. From then on, large-scale aid became a fixture, and by 1976 Israel had become the largest annual recipient of U.S. aid, a position it held until 2004.

Aid also became a tool of peacemaking. The 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, brokered by President Jimmy Carter, came with large aid packages for both countries. Egypt has received about $1.3 billion a year in U.S. military aid since the late 1980s. 

The security relationship deepened further in 1987, when Israel was named a “major non-NATO ally,” which gave it access to joint research projects and other benefits normally reserved for treaty allies.

The aid changed shape again in the 1990s. As Israel’s economy boomed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in a 1996 speech to Congress that Israel would phase out economic aid. The first 10-year agreement, signed under President Bill Clinton in 1999, set that plan in motion. Each year, economic aid shrank by $120 million while military aid grew by $60 million, and by 2007 economic aid had ended. Military aid continued under 10-year agreements signed in 2007 and 2016.

These agreements also reflected the diplomacy of their time. The first was negotiated as Israel took steps toward peace with the Palestinians, and the latest was designed to upgrade Israel’s military after the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, according to Dana Stroul, a former Pentagon Middle East official now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

But if the Cold War helped drive the relationship, why did aid continue after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991?

A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report put together for U.S. lawmakers points to a mix of reasons, including strong domestic support for Israel, shared strategic goals, a stated commitment to democratic values, and historical ties. It also notes that pro-Israel advocates have run organized efforts to build support in Congress since 1973.

What does the US get in return today?

The most tangible benefits are in military technology. The U.S. military has bought Israeli-made systems such as the Trophy protection system for Abrams tanks, and Israeli firms make the helmets and wings for the F-35 fighter jet. 

A 2014 agreement gave the Pentagon full access to Iron Dome technology, and the U.S. Marine Corps is now building elements of it into its own air defense system. The U.S. and Israel also jointly developed the Arrow and David’s Sling missile defense systems. 

Stroul adds that Israeli expertise helped U.S. forces counter roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israeli-made armor protected American troops, and that Israeli battlefield medicine techniques are now used regularly by the U.S. military.

Israel also serves as a kind of real-world testing ground for American equipment. Only the U.S. and Israel have used the F-35 in combat strikes, and the U.S. Air Force has praised the Israeli Air Force’s performance with the jet. 

Supporters also point to Israel’s ability to help protect American forces in the region. Dror Shalom, who led the Israeli Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Bureau from 2022 to 2026, argued that the war showed how U.S. bases in the region could become Iranian targets, and how Israel could help protect American forces.

Intelligence sharing is the benefit supporters cite most, but it’s also the hardest to measure. In its report accompanying the fiscal year 2027 intelligence authorization bill, the Senate Intelligence Committee described Israel as “a critical United States security partner whose defense and intelligence capabilities provide a strategic advantage.”

Aid also gives the U.S. significant leverage over Israeli policy. Daniel Shapiro, who helped negotiate the current agreement as U.S. ambassador to Israel, warned that ending aid would mean “a significant reduction in U.S. leverage” in the region. That leverage is also exactly what some Israelis want to escape.

Supporters also argue the aid is a bargain compared with what the U.S. spends to protect other allies. According to the Government Accountability Office, the Pentagon spent an average of $5.2 billion per year on its military presence in Japan and $3.3 billion per year in South Korea between 2016 and 2019, with tens of thousands of U.S. troops stationed in each. Israel receives about the same amount as South Korea, with almost no American troops based there. 

Noam Yakoby of the Misgav Institute, an Israeli conservative think tank, makes that comparison in a recent paper. But he acknowledges its limits: Israel isn’t a U.S. treaty ally and U.S. bases abroad serve wider American goals. 

Shay Khatiri, a researcher at the pro-Israel media watchdog CAMERA, adds in The Dispatch that unlike Japan or NATO members, Israel has no defense treaty with the U.S., which “pledges no troops to the Jewish state’s defense.” Nevertheless, the U.S. has sent forces to help defend Israel in recent years. After October 7, it deployed aircraft carriers to the region, led a coalition that shot down Iran’s April 2024 missile attack, and stationed a THAAD missile defense battery in Israel.

These examples help explain why Washington values the relationship. Whether annual aid is necessary to maintain those benefits is a separate question — one even some strong supporters of aid acknowledge.

“Many of the benefits America receives from Israel would continue even if the aid disappeared tomorrow,” wrote John Spencer of the Urban Warfare Institute, who argues the aid is a good investment. 

“The assistance did not purchase those benefits.” Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis, who heads U.S. research at INSS and warns that losing the aid would be costly, stresses that ending it wouldn’t cut the security ties.

How does the aid work in practice?

Since 1999, Israel and the U.S. have set aid levels through 10-year memoranda of understanding (MOUs). These are political commitments rather than treaties, so they aren’t legally binding and don’t need Senate approval. Congress still has to approve the funding each year and can add more or give less, but in practice it has almost generally followed the MOU.

Israel also gets several special arrangements that most other aid recipients don’t:

  • Money up front. Since 1991, Congress has required that Israel receive its yearly military aid in a lump sum in the first month of the U.S. fiscal year, which begins in October. Most countries get theirs in installments.
  • Interest. That money sits in an interest-bearing account at the Federal Reserve until Israel spends it.
  • Buy now, pay later. A system called cash flow financing allows Israel to sign contracts for expensive weapons, such as fighter jets, and pay for them over many years using future aid.
  • Faster approval. Like NATO members and a few close allies, Israel has a shorter congressional review period for certain arms sales: 15 days instead of 30.

The buy-now-pay-later system is a big reason ending aid quickly would be so complicated, since Israel has signed deals counting on money it hasn’t received yet. According to a State Department letter reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, Israel would still need about $10 billion beyond 2028 to pay for orders it had placed as of April 2026.

The Congressional Research Service has warned that if aid were to stop without a new arrangement, Israel would have to pay for existing contracts itself, find other financing, or cancel them, potentially triggering cancellation costs.

What strings and guarantees come with the aid?

Israel has to follow the same U.S. aid laws as other countries, plus a few that are specific to Israel, though how strictly they’re enforced is one of the most contested parts of the debate.

On paper, the rules are stringent. Israel has agreed to use U.S. weapons only for self-defense, and the U.S. is required to monitor how the equipment is used. The Leahy Law bars U.S. aid to foreign military or police units when there is credible information that they have committed gross human rights violations. Another law, Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act, bars assistance to countries whose governments restrict the delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid, though it allows exceptions.

Washington has also restricted support for Israel in the past.  In the 1980s, the Reagan administration banned cluster munitions transfers to Israel for several years after finding they had been used on civilian areas in Lebanon. In 1991, President George H.W. Bush delayed billions of dollars in loan guarantees to Israel over its settlement expansion.

The Gaza war brought new scrutiny to these rules. In February 2024, President Joe Biden issued a policy memo requiring countries receiving U.S. weapons to provide written assurances that they would comply with international humanitarian law and allow humanitarian aid. In May 2024, the State Department concluded it was “reasonable to assess” that Israel had used U.S. weapons in ways inconsistent with international humanitarian law, but also found Israel’s assurances credible enough for deliveries to continue. Biden paused a shipment of 2,000-pound bombs that month, but Trump released it in January 2025, and his administration rescinded the memo a month later.

Critics say the Leahy Law has never really been meaningfully enforced against Israel. In 2020, the State Department created a special review process for Israel, known as the Israel Leahy Vetting Forum. In April 2024, the department found that five Israeli units had committed gross human rights violations, all in the West Bank before October 7, but concluded that four had taken sufficient steps to address the violations. In August 2024, it cleared the fifth, the Netzah Yehuda battalion. The State Department has said it conducts Leahy vetting consistently for all countries, including Israel.

The relationship also comes with a commitment to preserve Israel’s military advantage. The qualitative military edge, or QME, is a U.S. commitment to help Israel maintain the military capabilities it needs to defeat potential regional threats. The idea is that Israel, a small country surrounded by larger ones, needs better weapons and technology to make up for being outnumbered.

Congress wrote that commitment into law in 2008. The Naval Vessel Transfer Act defines QME as Israel’s ability “to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties.” The law requires the U.S. to determine that proposed arms sales covered by the law to other Middle Eastern countries won’t undercut that edge.

In practice, QME shapes which countries get which American weapons, and when. Israel is usually the first country in the Middle East to get America’s most advanced weapons, and it now has about 50 F-35 stealth fighters. When the U.S. sells major weapons to Arab countries, it has sometimes given Israel offsetting weapons as part of the same package.

Proposed F-35 sales to other countries have tested that balance. In 2020, the Trump administration agreed to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates after the Abraham Accords. Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz said Israel would not oppose the sale, since the U.S. was also upgrading Israel’s capabilities. 

In November 2025, Trump said he would approve selling F-35s to Saudi Arabia, a country that still has no diplomatic relations with Israel. That raised new questions about whether Israel could lose its edge. Turkey has also sought F-35s, but a sale faces legal hurdles, partly because Turkey bought a Russian air defense system, and U.S. officials fear that operating the two systems side by side could give Russia insight into the F-35’s stealth technology.

Not everyone thinks QME serves American interests. The Arab Center Washington DC, a think tank focused on U.S.-Arab relations, argues that the commitment limits what the U.S. can sell to its Arab partners and could leave Washington at a disadvantage in the region. Supporters counter that QME helps Israel defend itself without relying on American troops to fight on its behalf.

The QME law governs arms sales, not aid. But American weapons, often purchased with aid money, are a major part of how Israel maintains its edge. That’s why current and former U.S. officials told The Wall Street Journal that cutting off aid would make preserving that edge more difficult.

How does US aid to Israel compare to aid to other countries?

The answer depends on whether you count all aid or only military aid, and whether you look at one year or decades.

Adjusted for inflation, Israel has received more U.S. aid since World War II than any other country, most of it military. By USAFacts’ count, it has gotten about 1.7 times as much as Egypt, the second-largest recipient. Next on the list are South Vietnam, Afghanistan, and South Korea, all countries where the U.S. fought major wars.

Over shorter periods, though, Israel isn’t always first. Between Russia’s 2022 invasion and early 2025, the U.S. provided Ukraine about $67 billion in military aid alone, according to the State Department. That’s far more than Israel received over the same period. But almost all of Ukraine’s aid came from five emergency packages Congress passed in 2022 and 2024. Israel’s aid, by contrast, arrives every year under long-term agreements, in peacetime and wartime alike, with extra funding added during wars like the one that followed October 7.

Israel also stands out for where its outside support comes from. For many other countries, U.S. aid is just one piece of a much larger financial picture.

Between early 2024 and mid-2025, Egypt received more than $60 billion in outside financial support, but very little of it resembled the aid Israel gets from the U.S. The largest piece came from a $35 billion deal with the United Arab Emirates to develop the Ras El Hekma coastal development, in which Egypt sold valuable real estate to Emirati companies. Most of the rest came as loans Egypt will have to repay, including an $8 billion IMF program and a $6 billion World Bank package.

Israel’s foreign military aid, by contrast, comes almost entirely from one country, the U.S., and almost entirely as military grants. Unlike loans, they don’t have to be repaid, although, as explained above, almost all of that money has to be spent on American weapons and ends up back in the U.S. economy. The one notable exception is Germany, which is paying about 20% of the cost of Israel’s newest submarines.

Israel also takes up a huge share of one specific U.S. aid account. For the past five years, the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing account has held about $6 billion a year, and Israel has received about half of it, according to Stroul. After funding for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, only 15% to 20% remained for every other country in the world. Stroul argues that, given how capable Israel’s military has become, that money could be better spent elsewhere.

Compared with the overall U.S. budget, though, the aid is small. In 2025, the U.S. government spent about $7 trillion in total, according to the Congressional Budget Office. The $3.8 billion Israel gets each year is about 0.05% of that, or about five cents out of every $100 the government spends. Even in 2024, when wartime packages pushed aid to Israel to around $12.5 billion, it was still less than 20 cents out of every $100.

Does Israel still need it?

Most experts agree that Israel’s economy could absorb the loss, but its military has come to rely on American aid in ways that are harder to replace.

Israel today is a wealthy country. Its economy has grown by about 115% in inflation-adjusted terms over two decades, and its GDP per capita of about $64,000 is higher than that of Germany and Britain. The $3.8 billion in annual aid now accounts for roughly half a percent of Israel’s GDP, according to INSS researchers. In the 1970s, by contrast, U.S. aid equaled about 19% of Israel’s GDP and 23% of its state budget, according to Raphael BenLevi, a senior fellow at the Misgav Institute. Israel has also become a major arms exporter in its own right, with a record $19.2 billion in defense sales in 2025, according to Israel’s Defense Ministry.

The aid’s share of Israel’s defense budget has also changed.  Twenty years ago, U.S. military financing covered about 30% of Israel’s defense budget, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a hawkish think tank. For most of the past decade, it covered 15% to 20%, and it briefly jumped to about 35% in 2024 due to wartime emergency aid. But Israel’s own defense spending has grown so much since October 7 that, without another emergency package, the regular aid is on track to cover less than 10%. Stroul, citing unpublished data from the Congressional Research Service, puts it at 6% in 2025. Globes calculated that replacing it would cost about 12 billion shekels a year, roughly what Israel spends on its entire police, prison, and firefighting system. Covering that without cuts elsewhere would require raising every income tax bracket by 2 to 2.5 percentage points, or raising VAT, Israel’s sales tax, by 1 percentage point.

Israel already spends heavily on defense. CRS puts it at 8.8% of GDP in 2024, one of the highest rates in the world. Defense now makes up about a quarter of all Israeli government spending, up from 16% in 2022, Stroul notes. And Israel’s dependence runs deeper than money. Its fighter fleet is almost entirely American-made, and its missile defenses rely on U.S. support.

In Washington, some of the debate has shifted from whether Israel needs aid to how quickly it could move off it. In a statement the State Department sent to The Times of Israel, a U.S. official called Israel “a technologically advanced and wealthy ally” that “will soon no longer require US funding to defend itself.” Some analysts have argued for years that Israel could stand on its own. In 2024, Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Steven Cook proposed phasing out aid over a decade. But analysts at FDD warn that ending aid “before Israel can recalibrate would leave Israel’s military vulnerable, hurting Washington as well.”

Why has it become so controversial?

Criticism of the aid now comes from across the political spectrum, and even from some of Israel’s supporters, though for very different reasons.

For decades, aid to Israel was one of the few things both parties agreed on. That consensus began to fracture in 2024 as the Gaza war intensified, with the largest split inside the Democratic Party. 

One clear sign came in July 2026. An amendment by Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) to strip $3.3 billion in military financing for Israel from a spending bill failed 314–104. But 103 Democrats voted for it, a slim majority, including former Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries, who is expected to become the next House speaker, opposed it as too broad. In the Senate, most Democrats voted in April 2026 to block a sale of bulldozers to Israel, compared with 19 who voted to block arms sales in November 2024.

The critique from the left centers on Gaza. Israel’s war there has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, who do not distinguish between civilians and combatants in their total, the WSJ reports. Critics argue that U.S. aid makes Americans complicit in the war’s toll and in settler violence in the West Bank, and that U.S. human rights laws aren’t being enforced. The shift has moved quickly. 

That criticism increasingly includes calls to end aid altogether. In April 2026, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez announced she would no longer support any U.S. aid to Israel, and the liberal Zionist group J Street dropped its long-standing support for military aid. Some Democrats also make a financial argument. “Israel is a very wealthy nation,” former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, a potential 2028 presidential candidate, said on HBO’s Real Time With Bill Maher in April. “There should be no more taxpayer support for what they want to do.”

The critique from the right is about money and priorities. Parts of Trump’s “America First” movement oppose sending taxpayer money abroad and question the alliance with Israel itself. Commentators like Tucker Carlson and Steve Bannon, and former Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, have argued that Israel’s wars are not America’s wars. The 2026 U.S.-Israeli war with Iran deepened that divide. After the midterms, Vice President JD Vance cited the Iran war and the relationship with Israel among the top reasons voters turned against Republicans.

Some of Israel’s supporters also want a phase-out.  In 2025, the conservative Heritage Foundation proposed replacing aid with a “strategic partnership” by 2047. A year later, Netanyahu publicly backed the idea. Sen. Lindsey Graham, long one of the aid’s biggest champions, then wrote that “we need not wait ten years.” Some pro-Israel analysts also see the aid as a political liability. Writing in Foreign Affairs in April, BenLevi argued that the need for Congress to keep voting on aid “gets Israel unnecessarily tangled up in American domestic politics and can turn the country’s conduct into a lightning rod.”

Defenders of the aid argue that ending it, especially suddenly, would hurt Israel without ending the hostility toward it. INSS researchers expect that ending aid would take a central argument away from Israel’s critics in the U.S., but wouldn’t make the criticism go away. Michael Singh, managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, warned that a sudden cutoff would “definitely leave the Israelis scrambling.” FDD, which supports a slow phase-out, has proposed that Congress require the administration to certify in writing each year that any cut to Israel’s aid serves U.S. national security interests.

What do Americans and Israelis think?

In the U.S., support for the aid has dropped sharply. An October 2026 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found in October 2026 that 56% of Americans say U.S. military aid to Israel should be decreased (21%) or stopped altogether (35%). When the Council first asked in 2012, only 38% said the same.

Views of Israel itself have shifted too. In February 2026, Gallup found that for the first time since it began asking in 2001, Americans no longer sympathized more with Israelis than with Palestinians. Gallup noted that the shift began around 2019, before October 7, and sped up during the Gaza war. A Pew Research Center survey in March 2026 found that 60% of Americans view Israel unfavorably, up from 42% in 2022.

The biggest divides are by party and age. Democrats and independents drove most of the change on aid, while Republicans overall still tend to favor keeping it at current levels, according to the Chicago Council. But the generational gap now runs through both parties. Pew found that 57% of Republicans under 50 view Israel unfavorably, up from 35% in 2022, while large majorities of older Republicans remain positive. Among Democrats under 50, the figure is 84%. INSS researchers Ben Sasson-Gordis and Ted Sasson found that even among white evangelicals, one of Israel’s most reliable sources of support, half of those under 50 now view Israel unfavorably.

Skepticism about aid isn’t entirely new. In 1975, 42% of Americans told pollsters that military aid to Israel should be cut back, more than said it should stay the same. What’s new is that it’s showing up at the ballot box.

The debate also featured in this year’s elections. On November 3, Democrats won control of both the House and the Senate in a campaign where aid to Israel was a major issue. In Michigan, Abdul El-Sayed, who campaigned on ending unconditional aid to Israel, won a Senate seat.

Netanyahu, for his part, has blamed the drop in support on rising antisemitism and on social trends in the U.S. unrelated to Israel. Even Trump acknowledged the shift. After the midterms, he told CBS News that Americans were unhappy about the Iran war and high gas prices, adding, “There’s a great dislike, incredibly, for Israel.”

In Israel, leaders broadly agree that aid should eventually end, but they disagree sharply about how fast, and about whether Netanyahu has handled it wisely.

The case for ending aid has strong support on the Israeli right. Netanyahu argues that Israel has “come of age” and should rely on joint investment rather than grants. Some of his coalition partners go further, arguing that the aid constrains Israeli decision-making. Members of his Likud party have pointed to the risk that a future U.S. president could attach conditions, such as a ban on annexing West Bank territory. 

Outside the coalition, Michael Oren, a former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., has called for ending aid since 2021. He called the Election Day timing of Trump’s announcement “such a cynical move,” but added, “Ultimately, I think it’s a good thing, but I fear it doesn’t stop with military aid.”

Some economic officials agree, for different reasons. A former senior Finance Ministry official told Calcalist that ending aid was “the best thing that could happen to us,” because Israel was tied to buying American. A current official said the cost is manageable and urged the government “not to listen to the howls of the defense establishment.”

Others are alarmed, especially by the speed. President Isaac Herzog said the announcement hit him “like a bolt out of the blue” and that he was “very worried.” Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel’s National Security Council, called it “an unexpected blow” that would cause “a great deal of damage,” including to joint projects like laser air defense.

Among Israeli economic and defense experts, much of the debate is about what replacing the aid would cost. Brig. Gen. (res.) Ram Aminach, a former economic adviser to the IDF chief of staff, told Israeli radio station 103FM that Israel can manage, saying “We’re not a country that can’t get a loan.” But he stressed that the cost is real, since replacing the aid would mean “every family in Israel has 430 shekels less a month.” Ben Sasson-Gordis says the bigger problem is what the money buys, since it pays for things Israel can’t make itself, like fighter jets and other Air Force equipment. Others want to hold on to as much aid as possible. Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror and Brig. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Nagel, who both worked on past aid agreements, have argued that Israel should secure as much assistance as it can.

Many Israeli security analysts favor a gradual, negotiated transition. INSS researchers argue for a new formal agreement that moves gradually from aid to a business partnership, while keeping Israel’s access to U.S. weapons and research. INSS expert Jesse Weinberg expects Israel to seek a slow decline in the early years, so it can restock ammunition used in recent wars. “The way everyone here is looking at it now is, essentially, ‘How do we prove we are a strategic partner?'” he told The Atlantic. Shalom backs that approach, provided the current agreement is fully honored through 2028. He also blamed much of the recent strain in the relationship on his own government’s policies, and urged Israelis to “acknowledge that without American support, Israel would have faced severe strategic distress in its recent military campaigns.”

Israeli politics may also shape what happens next. Israel’s October 27 election produced no clear majority. Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister, and Herzog has asked Gadi Eisenkot, whose Yashar party leads the opposition bloc, to try to form a government. Eisenkot’s party has made repairing ties with U.S. Democrats a top priority. Ynet reports that Eisenkot may not agree to forgo the aid for the two years remaining under the current agreement.

What happens now?

Trump’s announcement was vaguer than the headlines suggested. In a phone interview with “Fox & Friends,” Trump said he and Netanyahu had “made a deal months ago” to stop the annual aid by the end of the year. He said Netanyahu had “brought it up,” and that the decision was partly political, since Republicans were taking hits from Democrats over the issue. He didn’t say which funding streams he meant or how the change would work.

The announcement caught Israeli officials off guard. According to Ynet, Israel’s Defense and Finance Ministries were unaware of the agreement. Netanyahu’s office didn’t deny it, instead describing the move as a shift “from aid to partnership” and saying Israel’s economy is strong. A week later, it went further, saying Israel’s economy is strong enough to “gradually phase out American military assistance,” the way it phased out economic aid after 1996.

The idea itself wasn’t new. Netanyahu raised it with Trump at Mar-a-Lago in late December 2025, according to an Israeli official who spoke to The Atlantic. In January, he told The Economist he wanted to taper aid to zero over a decade. Formal talks on a new agreement opened in June 2026 with the stated goal of a “gradual transition from aid to a completely reciprocal partnership.”

What changed was the timeline. Trump’s version would end the money nearly two years before the current agreement expires in 2028. Experts doubt that can happen so fast. “It’s not plausible we stop by the end of this year,” Josh Paul, a former State Department official who resigned over Gaza policy and supports ending aid, told The Wall Street Journal.

Since then, Trump’s own administration has signaled a slower exit. Three U.S. and Israeli officials told The Times of Israel that the administration plans to keep providing aid in the coming years and to stick to the current agreement as much as possible. A U.S. official explained that Israel has already signed contracts with American defense firms that rely on the promised money, and that pulling out of them would cost American taxpayers. In a statement, the State Department said that “all obligations to American defense firms will be met.”

Talks on a new agreement are continuing, but no deal has been reached. According to an Israeli official, proposals have included phasing out aid completely within five to 10 years, and both sides agree there won’t be another 10-year, $38 billion deal. Ynet reported that the emerging agreement would cut aid in half and end it within five years, though those details haven’t been confirmed elsewhere. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that moving off aid was “a step that the Israelis themselves proposed to us,” and that Trump wants it to end as early as possible. But he added that the timeline is still being negotiated.

Here are the main questions a new arrangement would have to address.

Who pays for American weapons? Trump himself said Israel could still buy U.S. arms, just with its own money. BenLevi argues that Israel can’t build its own fighter jets, a major purchase funded by the aid, so it would keep buying them from the U.S. in roughly the same numbers. Israel would also have to pay for orders it has already placed, and it remains dependent on a regular flow of American bombs and other munitions. If the money stopped in 2027, the gap would land on a budget that hasn’t been passed yet, written by a government still unformed.

How much say would Congress have? CRS notes that if grants were replaced by joint programs run through the Pentagon, oversight would shift from foreign affairs committees to defense committees. A partnership model could reduce, though not entirely remove, Congress’s ability to use aid to influence Israeli policy. Congress could also use its own control over the money. Jeffries has called for “dramatic change with respect to the memorandum of understanding as it winds down.” A Democratic congressional aide told The Times of Israel that the party won’t back a complete end to aid. Instead, it would aim to restrict sales of offensive weapons and enforce stricter conditions on how U.S. weapons are used than the Biden administration did. Trump could veto such measures, and overriding a veto takes two-thirds of both chambers.

What would replace the aid? Israel proposed a 20-year agreement in late 2025 that would shift some funding into joint research and development, according to Axios. Netanyahu denied that report at the time. Congress is now considering a provision in the 2027 defense bill that would require the Pentagon to appoint an official to coordinate U.S.-Israeli weapons research, testing, and industrial cooperation. According to Globes, the main sticking point in negotiations isn’t money but technology. U.S. officials want Israeli expertise and patents managed in the U.S., which Israel resists. Critics say the plan would change the form of U.S. support rather than end it. Annelle Sheline, a former State Department official now at the Quincy Institute, a think tank that favors military restraint, told NPR the new setup would “enable the Israel lobby to protect this money” from collapsing public support and would “likely allow it to increase significantly.” Supporters say it would build on successes like Iron Dome and make the U.S. and Israeli militaries stronger together.

How would other countries be affected? CRS notes that aid to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan has long been linked through the peace treaties the U.S. brokered. If Israel’s aid ends, Egypt may have a harder time making the case for keeping its own. Stroul warns of another risk: that Israel might start buying weapons elsewhere once it’s no longer required to buy American.

Some analysts argue the money matters less than the rest of the relationship. “What matters more is whether the U.S. is going to sell Israel weapons, and under what conditions,” said Ilan Goldenberg, a former Biden administration official now at J Street. “Are we going to send aircraft carriers when Israel is worried about Iran? Are we going to shoot down those missiles?” he told The Atlantic. Those questions will land on a new Congress. Starting in January, Democrats will control both chambers, and with them, control over federal spending.

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